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Prosecutorial Disclosure
Violations: Punishment vs.
Treatment
by Kevin C. McMunigal*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent scholarship on prosecutorial disclosure violations' proposes
preventing violations through understanding and remedying the causes
of violations, such as cognitive error. Scholars who adopt this
view-what I call here the "treatment perspective"-often call for greater
transparency and cooperation from prosecutors. A frequently unacknowledged tension exists between such a treatment perspective and a
more traditional perspective-what I call here the "punishment
perspective"-that seeks to deter disclosure violations through greater
use of sanctions such as professional discipline.
The tension arises because increasing the certainty and severity of
sanctions, as the punishment perspective urges, creates a powerful
disincentive for individual prosecutors and prosecutor offices to be
transparent and cooperative, as the treatment perspective requires. In
brief, using information about disclosure violations to punish prosecutors
is likely to discourage them from creating and sharing information
necessary to understand and remedy such violations. In this Article, I
argue those concerned about prosecutorial disclosure violations need to
confront and address this tension.

* Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. Stanford University (B.A., 1973); University of California at Berkeley (J.D., 1979).
1. I use the phrase "disclosure violation" rather than the more common term "Brady
violation" because prosecutorial disclosure obligations are found in ethics rules, criminal
procedure rules, and statutes as well as in the Brady line of constitutional cases.
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WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

My first law review article dealt with Brady v.Maryland2 and argued
that its disclosure duty should apply in the context of negotiated guilty
pleas.' In the more than two decades since the publication of that
article, I have been reading, writing, and attending conferences about
Brady and prosecutorial disclosure. During that time, uncertainty about
the answers to two key empirical questions regarding prosecutorial
disclosure has persisted. Both questions are raised regularly in
scholarship and at conferences devoted to Brady and prosecutorial
disclosure.
How often do disclosure violations occur? This is the first of these
questions. Some, such as the keynote speaker at Mercer Law Review's
Defining and Enforcing the Federal Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence: The 13th Annual Georgia Symposium on Ethics
and Professionalism, Andrew Goldsmith of the United States Department of Justice, are confident that violations such as those that came to
light during the prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens are aberrations.
They claim that most prosecutors routinely honor their constitutional,
statutory, and ethical disclosure obligations. But others, including many
who were in the audience for Mr. Goldsmith's presentation, are skeptical
of such claims. Skeptics argue the disclosure violations that have come
to light-such as those in the Stevens case and others revealed through
DNA exonerations-are not aberrations, but rather the "tip of the
iceberg" of improper prosecutor conduct.
Why do prosecutorial disclosure violations occur? This is a second
question regularly raised by those who think, write, and attend
conferences about Brady. At conferences such as Mercer Law Review's
Symposium, I have often heard critics of prosecutors offer a simple
answer to this question. In their opinion, prosecutors withhold
exculpatory information because they want to win cases to improve their
conviction track records, and because they have little fear of getting
caught. This explanation treats nondisclosure as the product of
conscious calculation by the prosecutor. In contrast to this relatively
simple "rational actor" explanation, some contemporary scholars offer the
possibility of more complex and nuanced explanations for disclosure
violations. These scholars argue that a variety of psychological errors
and systemic factors likely play a role in disclosure failures.

2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3. Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989).
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So who is right on these questions? Are disclosure violations rare? Or
are they routine? When they do occur, is it the result of callous costbenefit calculation? Or are complicated psychological and situational
factors at play? For a variety of reasons, including the nature of
disclosure violations, the infrequency of imposition of disciplinary
sanctions, and the prevalence of negotiated guilty pleas, prosecutorial
disclosure violations remain largely hidden from view. So the stark
reality is that we currently have very little information with which to
answer either of these critical questions.
Without knowing either how often or why disclosure violations occur,
how can we rationally shape policy regarding prosecutorial disclosure?
To be able to answer the questions posed above, we need greater access
to information about prosecutorial disclosure practices. But how do we
obtain this information if those who have it-prosecutors-fear being
disbarred or suspended from law practice if they disclose it? This is the
crux of the problem this Article addresses.

III.

COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

Lack of negative consequences for violations of the disclosure
obligation imposed by Brady and its ethics counterpart in Rule 3.8(d) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct has long been a chronic problem
in our criminal justice system. The broad "materiality" standard used
by the United States Supreme Court makes reversal of a conviction
4
based on a Brady violation difficult to obtain. Prosecutorial immunity
makes recovery of monetary damages through civil litigation extremely
difficult as well.5 Furthermore, ethics authorities generally have been
reluctant to impose disciplinary sanctions on prosecutors who fail to
disclose.6
For many years both defense lawyers and academic commentators
have, with good reason, lamented this situation. They have adopted a
punishment perspective calling for greater certainty and severity of
sanctions against prosecutors who violate their disclosure obligations.
I include myself among those who have adopted a punishment perspective. But in recent years, Brady commentary increasingly has reflected

4. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Christopher Deal, Brady
MaterialityBefore Trial:The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and the Right to a Trialby Jury,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); Randall Grometstein &
Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing Out of a ConstitutionalDitch: ConstitutionalRemedies for
Gross ProsecutorialMisconduct Post Thompson, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1243, 1244-65 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady
Violations:A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987).
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a treatment perspective, focused on revealing, understanding, and
remedying the underlying causes of disclosure violations such as
cognitive error and systemic factors.
A few words of explanation are in order about my choice of the words
punishment and treatmentto label the competing perspectives I describe
in this Article. The phrase "punishment versus treatment" is not
typically associated with responses to lawyer misconduct. It is typically
used instead to refer to debate about how a society, and in particular a
criminal justice system, should deal with social problems closely
associated with crime, such as drug addiction and mental illness.'
In the context of drug addiction and mental illness, the punishmentversus-treatment debate poses a choice between a punishment approach
that relies on blame and deterrence, and a treatment approach that
seeks to understand and remedy some pathology. Punishment here
refers to criminal punishment, and treatment refers to professional
medical and psychological care aimed at remedying an underlying
physical or mental pathology.
In using punishment in the context of disclosure violations, I am not
suggesting that those who adopt this perspective urge that prosecutors
be criminally punished. Instead, I mean measures that, like criminal
punishment, reflect notions of blame and deterrence. And, in using
treatment in this Article, I am not suggesting that those who adopt this
perspective call for medical or psychological treatment of prosecutors.
What this perspective calls for, though, is treatment in the broad sense
that, unlike punishment, it seeks to understand individual and
institutional pathologies causing disclosure violations and remedy them
by a means other than punishment or the threat of punishment.'
I purposely use this "punishment-versus-treatment" terminology
regarding attitudes toward prosecutorial disclosure violations for several
reasons. First, I hope it will help readers recognize a significant
difference that has been emerging in perspectives toward dealing with
prosecutorial misconduct. These perspectives are analogous in important

7. An interesting collection of recent Brady scholarship, much of which reflects the
treatment perspective, can be found in a 2010 symposium issue of the Cardozo Law
Review. Symposium: New Perspectiveson Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What
Really Works?, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 1943 (2010).
8. See, e.g., Yuval Melamed, Mentally Ill Persons Who Commit Crimes:Punishment or
Treatment?, 38 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 100 (2010); Yara Costa, Female Drug
Offenders: Punishment or Treatment?, WOMEN OUT OF PRISON (Feb. 28, 2012, 8:41 PM),
http://www.nyunewsdoc.wordpress.com/alternatives-to-prison/female-drug-offenderspunishment-or-treatment/.
9. I use the word deterrence in this Article not as a synonym for prevention but to refer
to prevention through threat or fear of punishment.
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ways to the perspectives found and more easily recognized in the debate
about punishment versus treatment regarding drug addiction and
mental illness. Second, I use these terms because the choice between
these perspectives on prosecutorial disclosure violations creates the same
informational tension between use and access as the choice between
punishment and treatment of drug use and mental illness, as described
in detail below.
A.

The Punishment Perspective

A speaker at this Symposium beautifully exemplified the punishment
perspective when he told us that what we need to remedy prosecutorial
disclosure violations is some "good old-fashioned deterrence." As
previously mentioned, I have often adopted the punishment perspective
Model
myself, lamenting the general lack of enforcement of Brady 1and
0
PunishRule 3.8(d) and arguing for expansion of disclosure duties.
ment here would entail disciplinary sanctions, such as suspension or
disbarment, or internal sanctions imposed by a prosecutor's office, such
as a demotion or monetary fine.
The punishment perspective is characterized by a number of attributes. It tends to reflect notions of deterrence and retribution, and thus
tends to involve assessment of blame. It generally adopts an ex post, or
retrospective, viewpoint, addressing what we should do after a disclosure
violation has been revealed. This viewpoint often focuses on instances
that indicate the prosecutor had a high level of subjective culpability,
such as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness regarding the existence of
the information and the act of failing to disclose it. The punishment
perspective also tends to adopt narrow framing in assessing blame,
focusing on the individual prosecutor as opposed to the office, culture, or
situation in which the prosecutor operates. Further, it tends to assume
rational calculation on the part of the prosecutor-that the duty to
disclose loses out as the result of a rational calculation in which
prosecutors give greater weight to winning a case, their track record,
and career interest than their duty to disclose.
Compelling rationales support a punishment approach to prosecutorial
disclosure violations. Some prosecutors who fail to disclose exculpatory
information are clearly blameworthy and deserve to be punished.
Sanctions such as job loss, disbarment, or suspension would create a
powerful specific and general deterrent to disclosure violations.

10. Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of) Enforcement of ProsecutorDisclosureRules, 38
HoFSTRA L. REV. 847 (2010); Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and
Wrongful Convictions, 57 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 651 (2007); McMunigal, supra note 3.
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Imposition of sanctions would help educate prosecutors about their
disclosure obligations and incapacitate some prosecutors if the sanction
was disbarment or job loss. It would also help avoid the hypocrisy and
loss of respect for the criminal justice system that results from failing to
enforce clear ethical rules against prosecutors.
B.

The Treatment Perspective '
The treatment perspective differs from the punishment perspective in
several ways. Importantly, it does not focus on assessing blame or using
fear to deter violations. Rather, it focuses on understanding the
behavior rather than blaming it. And it seeks to change the behavior
through mechanisms other than the threat of sanctions.
The treatment perspective tends to adopt an ex ante, or prospective,
viewpoint, addressing what we should do before a disclosure violation
has been revealed. This viewpoint tends to focus on instances that
indicate the prosecutor had a low level of culpability, or perhaps no
culpability, regarding the existence of the information at issue, the act
of failing to disclose it, or both. The treatment perspective also favors
broad framing, focusing on the office, culture, or situation that surrounds
the prosecutor rather than just the individual prosecutor." And rather
than focusing on rational calculation, it emphasizes barriers to rational
calculation, such as cognitive errors on the part of the prosecutor.
Some who use the treatment perspective point to a variety of
psychological impediments to judgment that can cause even wellmotivated prosecutors to commit cognitive error leading to disclosure
failures. One example is what is often referred to as "tunnel vision."
Prosecutors and police, like all human beings, tend to engage in nonrational escalation of commitment to positions they have adopted. 2
Once a prosecutor has committed to the belief that a particular person
is guilty of a crime, she will tend to escalate that commitment rather
than re-examine it. Then, the prosecutor will often look for and see only
information that confirms this position and ignore information contrary
to it. Lawyers, like doctors, tend to see what they expect to see and fail
to spot what they do not expect to see. Prosecutors and defense lawyers
alike, both of whom deal mostly with guilty people, come to expect those
charged with crimes to be guilty and have a hard time seeing innocent,

11. See, e.g., Lawton P. Cummings, Can an Ethical Person Be an Ethical Prosecutor?
A Social Cognitive Approach to Systemic Reform, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 2139 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in CriminalCases, 2006 WIs. L. REv. 291, 351 (2006).
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If one expects guilt, one
or possibly innocent, criminal defendants.
exist, thus reducing the
not
does
evidence
exculpatory
will expect that
it.
recognize
to
capacity
the
incentive to look for and

IV.

THE TENSION

The Maternal Drug Use Analogy
Underlying many informational rules is a tension between the creation
of and access to information on the one hand and use of that information
4
once it exists on the other.' The debate about punishment versus
treatment of drug offenses illustrates this tension.
For example, during the crack cocaine epidemic, fetal endangerment
through maternal use of crack cocaine was a prominent item on the
15
The
agendas of prosecutors and legislators across the country.
involved
abuse
drug
maternal
such
to
respond
question of how best to
a tension between the use of and access to information about maternal
drug abuse. 6 Once information was obtained about maternal drug
abuse, some prosecutors sought to use that information to prosecute the
mothers on a variety of criminal charges for harming or creating a risk
17
Such a punishment
of harm to the fetuses they were carrying.
drug abuse to
maternal
approach would allow use of information about
to
information
this
of
criminally prosecute the mothers. But use
to
personnel
medical
prosecute the mothers would reduce the access of
were
they
information needed to treat the women and the fetuses
carrying. In short, a punishment approach would discourage women
from seeking drug treatment and prenatal care out of fear of providing
information that could be used to prosecute them.
A treatment approach, in contrast, would restrict use of information
about maternal drug use for punishment purposes in order to encourage
pregnant women to seek treatment and medical care for both the
mother's addiction and the fetus, and to share information about drug

A.

13. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorsand CorruptScience, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437,
446-47 (2008).

14. For a discussion of this tension, see Frank H. Easterbrook, InsiderTrading,Secret

Agents, EvidentiaryPrivileges,and the ProductionofInformation, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309,
313 (1981); McMunigal, supra note 3, at 997-1005.
15. Paul A. Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 27-28 (1990).
16. For a representative array of arguments from various viewpoints on whether to
criminally punish fetal endangerment through maternal drug use, see Symposium:
Criminal Liability for Fetal Endangerment, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 11, 11-51 (1990).
17. See, e.g., State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156,419 S.E.2d 32 (1992); Whitner v. State,
492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
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use with the providers of such treatment and care. A treatment
approach, however, allows some women who may be quite blameworthy
and dangerous to escape punishment for the harm they cause or risk to
the fetuses they are carrying. Interestingly, when faced with the choice
between the punishment and treatment approaches to maternal drug
use, legislatures across the country almost uniformly opted for a
18
treatment approach.

The same sort of tension between use of information and access to that
information underlies the choice between punishment and treatment of
proseciltorial disclosure violations. In the disclosure context, using
information about violations once we have it to punish violators is likely
to reduce access to information about when, why, and how often
disclosure violations occur-information necessary for effective treatment.
B.

Recent Scholarship
As noted previously, some interesting recent scholarship on prosecutorial disclosure violations reflects a treatment perspective. These scholars
tend not to address the informational tension that is the focus of this
Article. For example, Alafair Burke wrote an article encouraging those
working in this area to shift their focus from blaming prosecutors to
explaining and remedying what causes prosecutors to violate Brady. 9
She identified three potential sources of Brady violations: (1) the
structure of the Brady doctrine; (2) cognitive bias; and (3) the prosecutor's competing dual roles.2" Importantly, in my view, she argues that
use of a "rhetoric of fault" that blames prosecutors for Brady violations
is counterproductive in terms of changing prosecutorial behavior because
it alienates prosecutors and discourages prosecutorial participation in
reform. 2 ' It invites prosecutors to "resist and disengage."22
Professor Burke's argument relies on the logical inference that verbal
blaming of prosecutors will lead to a lack of prosecutorial transparency
and cooperation. She clearly sees the tension between blaming on the
one hand and transparency and cooperation on the other. Indeed, it is
critical to her argument. But the logic of that argument, which I find
convincing, is not limited to the rhetoric of blame. It extends as well to
the actual imposition of sanctions. If simply talking about prosecutors

18. Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (GUTTMACHER
INsTiTuTE), Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib SADP.pdf.
19. See Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors,31 CARDOzO L. REV. 2119 (2010).
20. Id. at 2132-36.
21. Id. at 2121-27.
22. Id. at 2130-31.
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as blameworthy discourages transparency and cooperation by prosecutors, surely treating them as blameworthy by imposing sanctions on
them, as a punishment approach insists, creates an even greater
disincentive for prosecutorial transparency and cooperation.
Professor Burke's article does not explicitly address the tension
between actually punishing prosecutors and encouraging transparency
and cooperation. I would be interested in hearing her views on how this
tension should be handled. Should we abandon, along with rhetoric
based on blame, sanctions based on blame because they too discourage
prosecutorial transparency and cooperation?
In another article published alongside Professor Burke's piece
discussed above, Rachel Barkow suggests using the current Department
of Justice ("DOJ") approach to corporate compliance as a model for
23
Like
dealing with prosecutor offices regarding disclosure violations.
remedy
Professor Burke, she seeks to enlist prosecutor offices in helping
wrongdoing by individual prosecutors. Again, I find her proposal and
arguments persuasive. But she does not address the tension between
use of information about prosecutorial wrongdoing and creation of and
access to that information.
The interaction of two key features appears to drive the DOJ approach
to corporate compliance as Professor Barkow describes it. One is an
24
increase in criminal penalties for corporate wrongdoing. The other is
the promise of insulation from (or reduction of) corporate criminal
penalties if the corporation cooperates in preventing crimes and
In sum, the corporation is
indentifying individual wrongdoers.2 5
encouraged to find and share information about internal wrongdoing by
the promise that the information will not be used against it.
Professor Barkow's proposal raises some interesting questions about
how this DOJ model would be adapted to prosecutor offices. How would
entity liability be created for prosecutor offices? Presently, ethics codes
do not recognize liability analogous to corporate entity liability for law
firms or other similar entities. Does she envision the creation of such
ethical entity liability for prosecutor offices that would be analogous to
the corporate entity liability that motivates corporations to cooperate
with the DOJ?
And, more importantly for purposes of this Article, how would
Professor Barkow deal with the use-versus-access informational tension
addressed above? Would she propose creating some sort of insulation

23. Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office, 31
CARDOzo L. REV. 2089 (2010).

24. Id. at 2099.
25. Id. at 2100.
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from threatened punishment for an individual prosecutor who blows the
whistle on another prosecutor's disclosure violation? Or, like the DOJ
corporate compliance model, would she propose insulation from
sanctions-a type of immunity or amnesty-if the prosecutor's office
prevents disclosure violations and indentifies individual wrongdoers? If
so, who would be insulated from liability?
V.

BALANCING USE AND ACCESS

How should we balance punishment and treatment? The point of this
Article is to prompt those of us working on issues of prosecutorial
disclosure to address this question and confront the tension between use
of and access to information about prosecutorial disclosure violations.
I include myself in this group. I have adopted both a punishment
perspective and a treatment perspective at times in my work without
addressing the use-versus-access tension. This Article is not the place
to fully explore this question, but I briefly sketch two possibilities for
balancing the use-versus-access tension in the paragraphs that follow.
A.

Mental States
One possibility would be to use prosecutorial mental states to restrict
punishment. One approach to this would be to limit sanctions to
prosecutors who have a high level of culpability, perhaps knowledge or
recklessness, about the existence of information required to be disclosed.
No sanction at all would be imposed on prosecutors who are only
negligent or lack culpability entirely.
Alternatively, a "graded" approach to mental states could be adopted.
Under this approach, the level of sanction would be proportionate to the
prosecutor's mental state regarding the existence of the information at
issue, just as the level of offense and punishment in the law of homicide
are proportionate to an actor's mental state about death caused by the
actor's actions. The highest punishment would be imposed on a
prosecutor who had knowledge. Progressively less severe sanctions, such
as reprimands, would be used for prosecutors who were reckless or
negligent.
Insulating prosecutors from liability or limiting their liability to
relatively mild sanctions for violations where they have no, or a
relatively low, culpable mental state would maintain punishment but
might create sufficient incentive for prosecutors to be open and
cooperative.

2013] PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE VIOLATIONS
B.

721

Amnesty or Immunity

Another approach would be to create some sort of amnesty or
immunity for disclosure violations if the prosecutor reports the violation.
One variation, as mentioned above in connection with Professor
Barkow's article, might be to create entity liability for a prosecutor's
office and simultaneously create immunity if the office reports violations
and cooperates in identifying and prosecuting individual prosecutors.
Under this approach, individual prosecutors who violate disclosure rules
would still be subject to punishment. This raises an interesting question
of whether prosecutor offices would be as willing as corporations have
been in cooperating and identifying individual violators.
A bolder immunity approach would be to create an amnesty provision
for individual prosecutors. One possibility might be granting amnesty
for revealing past violations that have not yet come to light. Another
would be amnesty for revealing past violations that lead to exoneration
of a person wrongfully convicted. Such amnesty could be offered for a
limited time period.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The status quo regarding prosecutorial disclosure violations is
unsatisfactory from both a punishment perspective and a treatment
perspective. The difficulty of discovering and sanctioning violations
means there is currently little effective punishment to deter, educate, or
incapacitate prosecutors who violate their disclosure obligations. Nor do
some of those prosecutors receive the sanctions they deserve. At the
same time, with some notable exceptions, prosecutor offices typically are
quite resistant to the sort of openness and cooperation that would allow
us to diagnose and treat various factors that contribute to disclosure
violations. So we do not have either effective punishment or effective
treatment.
We need to think clearly about and discuss what is the best way
forward from this unacceptable status quo. This Article raises a
question that, in my view, is central to that discussion but has largely
gone unaddressed: Can we reasonably expect prosecutors to be open and
transparent in helping us discover and treat the causes of prosecutorial
disclosure violations while at the same time punishing prosecutors who
commit those violations? In the terminology of this Article, can the
punishment perspective and the treatment perspective be reconciled? If
so, how? If not, which should we rely on going forward? I look forward
to listening to and participating in the discussion of how these questions
should be answered.

